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Decision making processes based 
on social conventional rules in 
early adolescents with and without 
autism spectrum disorders
Hidetsugu Komeda1,2, Hidekazu Osanai2, Kaichi Yanaoka2, Yuko Okamoto3, 
Toru Fujioka3,4,5, Sumiyoshi Arai3, Keisuke Inohara5,6,7, Masuo Koyasu2,8, Takashi Kusumi2, 
Shinichiro Takiguchi4, Masao Kawatani9, Hirokazu Kumazaki3,4, Michio Hiratani10, 
Akemi Tomoda3,4 & Hirotaka Kosaka3,4,5
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterized by problems with reciprocal social interaction, 
repetitive behaviours/narrow interests, and impairments in the social cognition and emotional 
processing necessary for intention-based moral judgements. The aim of this study was to examine 
the information used by early adolescents with and without ASD when they judge story protagonists 
as good or bad. We predicted that adolescents with ASD would use protagonists’ behaviour, while 
typically developing (TD) adolescents would use protagonists’ characteristics when making the 
judgements. In Experiment 1, we measured sentence by sentence reading times and percentages for 
good or bad judgements. In Experiment 2, two story protagonists were presented and the participants 
determined which protagonist was better or worse. Experiment 1 results showed that the adolescents 
with ASD used protagonist behaviours and outcomes, whereas the TD adolescents used protagonist 
characteristics, behaviours, and outcomes. In Experiment 2, TD adolescents used characteristics 
information when making “bad” judgements. Taken together, in situations in which participants cannot 
go back and assess (Experiment 1), and in comparable situations in which all information is available 
(Experiment 2), adolescents with ASD do not rely on information about individual characteristics when 
making moral judgements.
Moral psychology research has focused on two perspectives or models: Rationalist and intuitionist. The 
rationalist claims that moral knowledge and moral judgements are the product of a conscious process of 
reasoning and reflection1–3. The intuitionist claims that moral intuitions, such as unconscious moral emotions, 
occur immediately in situations and directly cause moral judgements4–7. In addition, knowing the facts of a 
situation changes the emotional response and the moral judgement that one makes8. For example, anger that a 
student failed to show up for an exam can turn to sympathy when one discovers that the reason for the absence 
was a death in the family9. Thus, situational as well as conscious and unconscious individual factors should be 
considered in investigations of moral judgements.
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Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterized by problems with reciprocal social interaction, impaired 
communication, repetitive behaviours/narrow interests10, and impairments in the social cognition and emotional 
processing necessary for intention-based moral judgements11,12. It is widely reported that individuals with ASD 
who have comorbid alexithymia are atypical in terms of recognizing their own emotions13,14 and in empathizing 
with others15–17. Empathy is a social emotion that plays a crucial role in such moral evaluations, because empathy 
allows moral judges to understand suffering and to use the resulting “gut-feelings” to either approve or disapprove 
of moral actions18,19.
According to social domain theory3, children develop not only moral concepts but also concepts of social con-
vention. Moral concepts are related humans’ natural aversion to harming others and natural attraction to helping 
others20,21, whereas social convention would involve no direct harm or victimization3. The distinction between 
moral and conventional domains is still debated22. Although recent studies have shown that moral cognition 
is based on conscious and unconscious processes22, the corresponding conscious and unconscious processes 
involved in social convention remain unclear. Decision-making processes based on social conventional rules 
have been shown to involve one or more of three possible components: Trait inferences based on characteristics23, 
inferences based on behaviours24, and evaluation of outcomes as outputs25. Typically developing individuals in 
early adolescence make trait inferences as well as behaviour- and intention-based inferences26. Individuals with 
ASD evidence deficits in more complex intention-based moral judgement tasks that require integration of infor-
mation about agent mental states with information about the outcomes of behaviours19. Recent studies using 
IAT (implicit association test) tasks have shown that implicit social biases are largely intact in ASD23, suggest-
ing that individuals with ASD do have the ability to make trait inferences. Children with ASD can also make 
behaviour-based inferences. They are able to make correct moral judgements about so-called naughty behaviour, 
although their judgement criteria are more rigid24. Similarly, children with ASD can have knowledge of social 
rules but are less flexible than typically developing (TD) children in applying these rules during moral reasoning25. 
Adolescents with ASD are also able to evaluate outcomes of moral decision-making processes27. Although adults 
with ASD have difficulty assessing the seriousness of moral and disgust-based transgressions and providing 
appropriate welfare-based moral justifications28, they do not appear to exhibit fundamental deficits in moral 
judgements29. At least under certain circumstances, individuals with ASD and typically developing individuals 
can provide similar intuitive judgements of intentionality30.
We tend to make up reasons post-hoc for the conflicting intuitions that arise within us31,32. Children with 
autism are known to have difficulty in solving social problems, particularly in conflict resolution33. This suggests 
that they may have difficulty in cases of conflict between traits and behaviours, rather than problems in separately 
making trait inferences, behavioural inferences, and outcome evaluations. The present study examines the effect 
of (in) congruency between traits and behaviours on moral judgements, as well as the separate effects of trait and 
behavioural inferences, by creating discrepancies in the information about story characters that resemble social 
conflict situations.
Previous studies have typically used short stories involving situations in which the characters are at risk of 
harm. Moral dilemmas are often presented as variations of the basic trolley, bystander, or footbridge scenarios34, 
and two situations are presented to clarify the nature of the transgression believed to make the situation worse. 
In the final part of the story, an alternative action is proposed in the form of a commission or omission35. This 
alternative course typically results in less harm than the original bad outcome in terms of overall quantitative 
outcome, or in terms of providing other benefits2. Such studies have provided valuable information about moral 
judgements in the case of negative outcomes. However, in daily life, positive or fun events occur as well as negative 
or harmful ones. Yet there have been few studies about moral judgements in the case of good outcomes36,37. The 
present study investigates decision-making processes based on social conventional rules, assessing both positive 
and negative aspects of a protagonist’s characteristics, behaviours, and story outcomes.
The fundamental aim of this study was to examine the information early adolescents use when they judge 
other children’s behaviour as good or bad based on social conventional norms. We predicted that adolescents with 
ASD would rely on protagonists’ behaviour, whereas TD adolescents would rely more on protagonist characteris-
tics during the decision-making processes. To identify the types of information upon which adolescents with and 
without ASD rely, we created simple, novel stories in which the protagonist’s characteristics and behaviours, as 
well as story outcomes, were manipulated. In Experiment 1, we measured sentence by sentence reading times and 
good or bad judgements. Our immediate moral intuitions are made via conscious deliberation, and such delib-
eration plays a central role in our moral judgements8. Thus, in Experiment 2, two protagonists were presented in 
conscious and comparable situations to determine which protagonist is better or worse.
Experiment 1
Method. Participants. Sample-size determination. Twenty adolescents with ASD and twenty TD adoles-
cents were recruited. We followed recommended guidelines38 and calculated our target sample size using an 
estimated effect size, d, of 0.4539, which would require a sample size of approximately 40 participants for the study 
to have 80% power. Because the data for one adolescent with ASD were lost, we analyzed nineteen adolescents 
with ASD (mean age = 12.5 years) and twenty age- and IQ- matched TD adolescents (mean age = 12.3 years; see 
Table 1).
Adolescents with ASD were recruited at the Department of Neuropsychiatry of the University of Fukui 
Hospital, Japan, and the Department of Psychiatry and Hiratani Clinic for Developmental Disorders of Children, 
Japan. Pediatric psychiatrists (M.H. and H.K.) diagnosed participants based on the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-510) and on the standardized criteria of the Diagnostic Interview for Social 
and Communication Disorders40, which is reported to possess good psychometric properties41. This instrument 
also contains items on early development and a section on activities of daily living, which provide data about 
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functioning in areas other than social- and communication-related domains40. The ASD group consisted of 19 
participants (2 females and 17 males).
TD adolescents were recruited in the local community and were matched to the adolescents with ASD based 
on age and gender. A total of 39 participants completed the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children—Fourth 
Edition (WISC-IV)42, for assessment of intelligence quotient (IQ). The TD group consisted of 20 participants 
(2 females and 18 males).
All participants were financially compensated for their time and informed consent from all participants and 
their parents was obtained. All methods were carried out in accordance with the approved guidelines. The study 
was approved by the local Ethics Committees (Kyoto University and the University of Fukui) and conducted in 
accordance with the declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli and procedure. As shown in Table 2, each story consisted of three sentences (first sentence: characteris-
tics; second sentence: behaviours; and third sentence: outcomes). The number of letters in the third sentences was 
identical across all stories so that reading times were comparable across conditions. The stories were presented 
one sentence at a time on a computer screen. Each sentence remained on the screen until the participant pressed 
the space bar, and then the next sentence appeared. Thus, participants could not refer back to the previous sen-
tences but could read the sentences at their own pace. The computer recorded reading times for each sentence.
After reading each story, participants judged the story protagonists as good or bad. Participants read 24 sto-
ries, 3 for each combination of 2 characteristics (good, bad) × 2 behaviours (good, bad) × 2 outcomes (good, 
bad). Before the formal trials, the participants were given two practice stories to familiarize themselves with the 
reading procedure.
Results
Analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) were conducted to assess for interaction effects of working memory and 
language comprehension, controlling for IQ scores based on WISC-IV42 as a covariates of the dependent varia-
bles of reading times and judgements. Results indicated no significant interaction effects of working memory and 
language comprehension. Thus, we proceeded with our analysis without including covariates and report these 
results here.
Reading time results for sentence by sentence task. We conducted a group (ASD vs. TD) × charac-
teristics × behaviours × outcomes analysis of variance (ANOVA) for reading times of the target sentences (Fig. 1). 
The group × characteristics × outcomes interaction was significant, F (1, 37) = 8.34, p = 0.01, ηp2 = 18, Simple 
effects clarified the differences separately for each group (Table 3).
ASD group (n = 19) TD group (n = 20) t p
Age in years 12.5 (1.2) 12.3 (1.0) 0.64 p > 0.05
Full-scale IQ 100.0 (13.9) 107.1 (11.8) − 1.7 p > 0.05
Verbal comprehension 101.6 (17.2) 107.9 (11.2) − 1.4 p > 0.05
Perceptual reasoning 103.8 (14.4) 105.5 (12.0) − 0.40 p > 0.05
Working Memory 97.3 (13.1) 105.1 (15.5) − 1.7 p > 0.05
Processing speed 93.7 (14.4) 100.0 (11.1) − 1.5 p > 0.05
AQ total scores 27.2 (8.6) 14.7 (5.9) 5.3*** p < 0.001
 AQ: Social skill 5.8 (2.7) 3.1 (2.3) 3.5** p < 0.005
 AQ: Attention Switching 5.9 (1.9) 2.6 (1.8) 5.7*** p < 0.001
 AQ: Attention Detail 3.6 (2.1) 4.1 (2.2) − 0.60 p > 0.05
 AQ: Communication 5.8 (2.7) 1.7 (1.5) 6.1*** p < 0.001
 AQ: Imagination 5.9 (2.4) 3.4 (2.1) 3.5** p < 0.005
Table 1.  Mean chronological age, WISC-IV IQ scores, and Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) scores of 
early adolescents with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and typically developing (TD) adolescents.  
Note. Means (SDs) are presented.
Good characteristics with Good behaviour Good characteristics with Bad behaviour
Takeru-kun is a nice boy who likes to please his father. Takeru-kun is a nice boy who likes to please his father.
He said to his father, “Let’s go watch your favorite football team play!” He said to his father, “Let’s go see my favorite cartoon movie!” when his father was very busy.
His father smiled when he looked at his son’s happy face.
Bad characteristics with Good behaviour Bad characteristics with Bad behaviour
Tomoo-kun is a selfish boy who only thinks of himself. Tomoo-kun is a selfish boy who only thinks of himself.
He said to his father, “Let’s go watch your favorite football team play!” He said to his father, “Let’s go see my favorite cartoon movie!“ when his father was very busy.
His father smiled when he looked at his son’s happy face.
Table 2.  Sample stories in Experiment 1.
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In the ASD group, the characteristics × behaviours interaction was significant, F (1, 18) = 5.87, p = 0.03, 
ηp2 = 0.25. Post-hoc test results showed that the reading times for good characteristics with good behaviours 
(2725.0 msec.) were faster than those for bad characteristics with good behaviours (3295.3 msec.; F (1, 18) = 7.20, 
p = 0.02, ηp2 = 0.29). The characteristics × outcomes interaction was also significant for the ASD group, 
F (1, 18) = 4.46, p = 0.05, ηp2 = 0.20. Reading times for good characteristics with good outcomes (3348.9 msec.) 
were longer than those for good characteristics with bad outcomes (2628.2 msec.; F (1, 18) = 5.54, p = 0.03, 
ηp2 = 0.24), and the reading times for bad outcomes with bad characteristics (3121.4 msec.) were longer than 
those for bad outcomes with good characteristics (2628.2 msec.; F (1, 18) = 4.65, p = 0.04, ηp2 = 0.21). Finally, the 
behaviours × outcomes interaction was also significant for the ASD group, F (1, 18) = 21.48, p = 0.00, ηp2 = 0.54. 
Reading times for good behaviours with good outcomes were faster than those for good behaviours with bad 
outcomes, F (1, 18) = 13.50, p = 0.00, ηp2 = 0.43, the reading times for bad behaviours with bad outcomes were 
faster than those for bad behaviours with good outcomes, F (1, 18) = 16.04, p = 0.00, ηp2 = 0.47, the reading 
times for good outcomes with good behaviours were faster than those for good outcomes with bad behaviours, 
F (1, 18) = 10.86, p = 0.00, ηp2 = 0.38, and the reading times for bad outcomes with bad behaviours were faster 
than those for bad outcomes with good behaviours, F (1, 18) = 26.94, p = 0.00, ηp2 = 0.60.
For the TD group (Table 3), the main effect of behaviours was significant, F (1, 19) = 6.45, p = 0.02, ηp2 = 0.25, 
and the reading times for bad behaviours were longer than those for good behaviours. The behaviours × outcomes 
interaction was also significant, F (1, 19) = 15.19, p = 0.00, ηp2 = 0.44. Post-hoc test results showed that reading 
times for good behaviours with good outcomes were faster than those for good behaviours with bad outcomes, 
F (1, 19) = 14.71, p = 0.00, ηp2 = 0.44, the reading times of bad behaviours with bad outcomes were faster than 
those for bad behaviours with good outcomes, F (1, 19) = 5.40, p = 0.03, ηp2 = 0.22, reading times for good out-
comes with good behaviours were faster than those for good outcomes with bad behaviours, F (1, 19) = 14.02, 
p = 0.00, ηp2  = 0.42, and reading times for bad outcomes with bad behaviours were faster than those for bad out-
comes with good behaviours, F (1, 19) = 8.04, p = 0.01, ηp2 = 0.30.
Analyses of judgements. We next conducted a group × characteristics × behaviours × outcomes ANOVA 
based on percentages of good judgements (Fig. 2). The interaction between group × outcomes × charac-
teristics × behaviour on good or bad judgements was significant, F (1, 37) = 4.33, p = 0.04, ηp2 = 0.10. Simple 
effects revealed the differences in each group (see Table 4). In the ASD group, the main effects of behaviours 
(F (1, 18) = 129.16, p = 0.00, ηp2 = 0.88) and outcomes (F (1, 18) = 38.53, p = 0.00, ηp2 = 0.68) were significant. 
In the TD group (Table 4), the main effects of characteristics (F (1, 19) = 4.83, p = .04, ηp2 = 0.20), behaviours 
Figure 1. Reading times for target sentences in Experiment 1. The blue bars show good characteristics with 
good behaviours, the dark orange bars show good characteristics with bad behaviours, the gray bars show bad 
characteristics with good behaviours, and the light orange bars show bad characteristics with bad behaviours.  
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
ASD TD
Main effect of characteristics n. s. n. s.
Main effect of behaviours n. s. *
Main effect of outcomes n. s. n. s.
Characteristics × behaviours interaction * n. s.
Characteristics × outcomes interaction * n. s.
behaviours × outcomes interaction ** **
Characteristics × behaviours × outcomes 
interaction n. s. n. s.
Table 3. ANOVA main effects and interactions on reading times in Experiment 1. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.001, two tailed.
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(F (1, 19) = 80.72, p = 0.00, ηp2 = 0.81) and outcomes were significant (F (1, 19) = 26.11, p = 0.00, ηp2 = 0.58). 
The characteristics × behaviours × outcomes interaction was also significant, F (1, 19) = 6.73, p = 0.02, ηp2 = 0.26. 
In the judgement of a person with “bad characteristics, good behaviours, with good outcomes”, the ASD group 
(96.5%) judged “Good person” more than the TD group did (71.7%); F (1, 37) = 10.90, p = 0.00, ηp2 = 0.23.
Discussion
The interaction between behaviours and outcomes on reading times showed that, for both the ASD and TD 
groups, the reading times for good behaviours with good outcomes were faster than those for good behaviours 
with bad outcomes, the reading times for bad behaviours with bad outcomes were faster than those for bad behav-
iours with good outcomes, the reading times for good outcomes with good behaviours were faster than those of 
good outcomes with bad behaviours, and that the reading times for bad outcomes with bad behaviours were faster 
than those for bad outcomes with good behaviours. Thus, groups showed congruency effects between behaviours 
and outcomes in the sentence-by-sentence reading task. The congruency effects are likely observed as a function 
of updating previous information43. If the behaviours and outcomes share the same valence, the processing load 
to update the information is relatively low, and thus reading times do not increase. However, if the behaviours and 
outcomes have opposite valences, the processing load to update the information is high, with a corresponding 
increase in reading times44.
The interaction between characteristics and behaviours was significant only for the ASD group. This sug-
gests that the ASD group focused on the congruencies between characteristics and behaviours, particularly when 
reading about protagonists with bad characteristics and good behaviours. This effect did not reach a statistically 
significant level for protagonists with bad characteristic and good behaviours, when protagonists with bad char-
acteristic and bad behaviours served as the comparison.
Although the interaction between characteristics and outcomes was significant for the ASD group, the con-
gruency effects between characteristics and outcomes were not observed (i.e., reading times for good characteris-
tics with good outcomes were not faster than those for good characteristic with bad outcomes, and reading times 
for bad outcomes with bad characteristics were not faster than those for bad outcomes with good characteristics). 
Thus, in both the ASD and TD groups, the congruencies between protagonist characteristics and story outcomes 
were not applied to the judgement processes.
The TD group appeared to focus on the behavioural information provided, given a significant main effect of 
behaviours. In the judgement processes, situational factors are important8,9. The TD group took situational factors 
behind the protagonist’s bad behaviours into consideration.
Overall, the ASD group used behaviours and outcome information to render their judgements, whereas the 
TD group used characteristics, behaviours, and outcome information in these decision-making processes based 
Figure 2. Percentages of “good” judgements in Experiment 1. The blue bars show good characteristics with 
good behaviours, the dark orange bars show good characteristics with bad behaviours, the gray bars show bad 
characteristics with good behaviours, and the light orange bars show bad characteristics with bad behaviours.  
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
ASD TD
Main effect of characteristics n. s. *
Main effect of behaviours ** **
Main effect of outcomes ** **
Characteristics × behaviours interaction n. s. n. s.
Characteristics × outcomes interaction n. s. n. s.
behaviours × outcomes interaction n. s. n. s.
Characteristics × behaviours × outcomes 
interaction n. s. *
Table 4. ANOVA main effects and interactions on judgements in Experiment 1. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.001, two tailed.
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on social conventional rules. The ASD group did not appear to use the characteristics information. This finding is 
not explained by differences in working memory and language comprehension abilities, as ANVOCA indicated 
no significant interaction effects due to these covariates.
The ASD group was more likely to judge “good person” in the case of a protagonist with “bad characteristics, 
good behaviours, with good outcomes”, compared to the TD group. Thus, adolescents with ASD judged pro-
tagonists as good when their behaviour was good, whether or not the protagonists also had bad characteristics. 
However, this pattern was observed for the “good” outcomes only.
The adolescents with ASD focused on the congruencies between the characteristic and behaviours as well 
as the congruencies between the behaviours and the outcome. Thus, they were engaged in the updating process 
twice. However, the TD adolescents focused on the congruencies between the behaviours and the outcome. Thus, 
they engaged in only a single updating process. These findings highlight a strategic difference between ASD and 
TD adolescents with regards to moral decision-making. Although the adolescents with ASD studied here had the 
same working memory abilities as TD adolescents, these adolescents relied on a relatively inefficient judgement 
strategy. This updating load likely prevents adolescents with ASD from using the available characteristics infor-
mation to render their judgements, while TD adolescents can use the characteristics information based on use of 
more efficient strategies involving a minimum updating load.
We predicted that adolescents with ASD use protagonists’ behaviour, while TD adolescents use protagonists’ 
characteristics in the judgements. This prediction was partially supported, such that the adolescents with ASD 
used behaviours and outcomes, while the TD adolescents used the characteristics, the behaviours, and outcomes.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, a sentence-by-sentence reading paradigm was used, such that participants could not re-read 
previously presented sentences. Although this paradigm was useful in investigating integration processes dur-
ing ongoing judgements, accessibility was not controlled: Behavioural information (the second sentence) was 
more proximate to the outcome than characteristics (first sentence) because of the fixed presentation order of the 
sentences.
In Experiment 2, all sentences were presented at the same time to control accessibility. This enables the par-
ticipants to compare the different type of stories when both the characteristics and behaviours are available at the 
same time. In this way we can identify the information that is relied upon by the participants when making their 
moral decisions.
Method. Participants. All the participants who completed Experiment 1 also completed Experiment 2.
Stimuli and procedure. As shown in Fig. 3(a) and (b), each outcome had two prior contexts. The genders and 
the story characters’ positions (left or right presentation location) were counterbalanced. In the case of good 
outcomes, good characteristics/good behaviour was compared with bad characteristics/bad behaviour, and 
good characteristics/bad behaviour was compared with bad characteristics/good behaviour. In the case of bad 
outcomes, bad characteristics/bad behaviour was compared with good characteristics/good behaviour, and bad 
characteristics/good behaviour was compared with good characteristics/bad behaviour. For good outcomes, the 
participants were asked to judge which person is better, and for the bad outcome, they judged which person is 
worse. The participants could choose story characters’ characteristics or behaviours when rendering their judge-
ments. They were not instructed which information should be chosen because we wished to assess strategic dif-
ferences across the groups.
Results. The percentages of behaviour-based judgements were calculated (Fig. 4). For example, in the good 
outcome condition (“which person is better?”), and for the comparison of good characteristics/bad behaviour and 
bad characteristics/good behaviour, the response that the protagonist with bad characteristics/good behaviour 
Figure 3. (a) Comparison task in the good outcome in Experiment 2. The good outcome condition asked 
which characters were better. “-kun” is the suffix which is added to a male person’s name. (b) Comparison task 
in the bad outcome in Experiment 2. The bad outcome condition asked which characters were worse. “-san” is 
the suffix which is added to a female person’s name.
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was better than the protagonist with good characteristics/bad behaviour was considered to be a behaviour-based 
judgement.
Judgement time results in comparison task. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) of judgement times for 
groups (ASD vs. TD) × outcomes (good vs. bad) × congruencies (congruent vs. incongruent) revealed longer 
judgement times for incongruent stories (bad characteristics/good behaviour vs. good characteristics/bad behav-
iour) than for congruent stories (good characteristics/good behaviour vs. bad characteristics/bad behaviour), 
F (1, 37) = 38.61, p = 0.00, ηp2 = 0.51. This suggests that the judgement times for incongruencies were longer than 
those for congruencies. Thus, participants did not respond solely on the basis of behaviour or characteristics as 
single factors. The interactions and other main effects were not significant.
Analyses of behavioural-based judgements in comparison task. A group × outcomes × congruen-
cies ANOVA was conducted for behavioural-based judgements. The group × outcomes interaction was signifi-
cant, F (1, 37) = 4.23, p = 0.05, ηp2 = 0.10. More behaviour-based judgements were made for good outcomes than 
for bad outcomes in the TD group, F (1, 19) = 5.17, p = 0.03, ηp2 = 0.21. In the ASD group, the effect of outcomes 
was not significant, F (1, 18) = 0.00, p = 0.99, ηp2 = 0.00. The other interactions and other main effects were not 
significant.
Discussion
For both ASD and TD groups, the comparison of characters required more time for the incongruent than for 
the congruent story. On the other hand, behavioural-based judgements differed across the groups. In the ASD 
group, judgements did not change based on the differences between good outcomes (90.4%) and bad outcomes 
(90.4%). However, in the TD group, the judgements did vary as a function of story outcomes. The TD adolescents 
made behavioural-based judgements for 90.4% of the good outcomes and 79.6% of the bad outcomes. This task 
provided participants with an opportunity to choose the information to emphasize (characteristics versus behav-
iours) when making their judgements. The pattern of findings suggests that for bad outcomes, the TD adolescents 
used characteristics information (21.4%) more than adolescents with ASD (9.6%). Thus, the TD adolescents used 
characteristics-based information during their decision-making processes based on social conventional rules.
General Discussion
Experiment 1 showed that the adolescents with ASD engaged in at least two updating processes during 
decision-making: One to process the congruencies between the characteristics and behaviours, and another 
to process the congruencies between the behaviours and outcomes, whereas TD adolescents appear to engage 
in a single updating process for the congruencies between the behaviours and outcomes, when reading stories 
describing social conventional rules. As a consequence of such strategic differences, ASD adolescents fail to make 
use of characteristics information when making moral judgements about a story protagonist. In Experiment 2, 
TD adolescents used characteristics information when making moral judgements in a situation where multiple 
sources of information could be processed at the same time.
We predicted that adolescents with ASD would use protagonists’ behaviour, whereas TD adolescents would 
use protagonists’ characteristics when making the judgements. In both situations we studied, the adolescents with 
ASD did not rely on the characteristics information provided, in contrast with the TD adolescents.
Finally, it is important to note some limitations of this study. First, this study did not consider the role of 
empathy in moral judgements. Empathy or other emotional difficulties are associated with ASD, but recent work 
Figure 4. Comparison task: Judgements based on behaviours in Experiment 2. For good outcomes, the blue 
bars show good characteristics with good behaviours vs. bad characteristics with bad behaviours, and the dark 
orange bars show bad characteristics with good behaviours vs. good characteristics with bad behaviours. For 
bad outcomes, the gray bars show bad characteristics with bad behaviours vs. good characteristics with good 
behaviours, and the light orange bars show bad characteristics with good behaviours vs. good characteristics 
with bad behaviours. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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has suggested that many of these effects are due to comorbid alexithymia45,46. As a next step, the relationship 
between the alexithymia and moral judgement should be further explored19,36. Second, the diagnoses were not 
obtained using the Autism Diagnostic Interview – Revised (ADI-R)47 or the Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule (ADOS)48. In this study, influential Japanese child psychiatrists worked to ensure proper diagnoses of 
all adolescents with ASD. Future studies should attempt to include these standard diagnostic instruments as well. 
Third, the differences between characteristics and behaviours should be investigated. For example, which is more 
accepted: Bad characteristics with good behaviours or good characteristics with bad behaviours? Neuroimaging 
studies would be promising to clarify the neural mechanisms underlying the differences.
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